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Linacre QuarterlY 
In the Matter of Clare Conroy 
John R. Connery, S.J . 
A noted theologian and long-time member of the Linacre Quarterly editorial 
advisory board, Father Connery has taught at Loyola Uni versity of Chicago, 
and has served as advisor to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
in Washington. 
Claire Conroy was an 84-year old nursing home res ident who suffered 
from serious and irreversible physical and mental impairments. At the most, 
she had about a year to live, but she would die wi thin a short time if a 
nasogastric tube, through which she was being fed , were removed . She was 
able to respond "somehow" , although only in a minimal way. But she would 
not be classified either as comatose or in a persistent vegetati ve state, much 
less as brain-dead . The questi on that was raised had to do with the removal 
of the nasogastric tube. Wo uld this be permissible? 
Legal Solution 
The legality of removing the tube was tested in the New Jersey courts. 
The trial court decided to permit its removal on the grounds that Ms. 
Conroy's life had become ' ' impossibly and permanently burdensome·· and th~t ~~r " intellectual function had been permanently reduced to a very Pnmntv~ level.'' Briefly , it was a quality-of-life judgment . It was not based f~ the ktnd of burden or benefit offered, but on the quality of the patient' s 1 
e apart from the treatment . 
th The guardian ad litem appealed the case and the Appellate Court ruled 
t at removing the tube would be tantamount to killing the woman. According 
_othe court, the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment was limited to ~ncurable and terminally ill patients who are brain-dead. irreversibly comatose 
; vegetative, who would get no benefit from treatment . Briefl y. the 
:.llate Court did not depart from the quality-of-life approach but simply Wi~~ that the quality-of-I_ife of ~s. Conroy was sufficiently low to ~~rrant 
rawal of tubal feedmg. Smce she could respond '"somehow , her 
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quality-of-life was above that of t~e br~in-dead_, ~rreversibly cc 
presistently vegetative, so tubal feedmg (hfe-sustammg treatment) 
.tose or 
legally 
required. · · f 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey o~ert~med the dec1s1_on o t 
Court and set up a triple test for termmatmg treatment ~n such 
with these tests that we are concerned. The general bas~s f~r tl 
Court decision was a common law right to self-d~te~mmat10n 
of any human being. The cou~t recogni~ed that th1s nght was r 
but would yield to a compelling state mterest. 
Moral Solution 
The court had no doubt that Ms. Conroy, if competent, ~auld 
to have the nasogastric tube removed. The present quest1on a ; 
she was not competent. How does one decide in such cases whet. 
may be terminated? The Supreme Court proposed three_ test ~ 
these decisions for the incompetent. The cou~t w~s dealmg ' 
from the viewpoint of law. Our concern here IS w1th the mo r. 
of the case and the tests in question. Although not unrelated , the 
two different dimensions and they should not b~ confused , so I 
to examine these tests from a moral perspective . . 
Subjective Test 
The first test the court proposed, which it called a subjec 
that it be clear that the patient would have refused treatrr. r 
circumstances of the case. The court enumerated several ~c< 
in which the patient (when competent) might have made her mt 
If it was clear that she would have refused treatment, no furthc1 
be necessary. 
Consent and Morality 
pellate 
es . It is 
upreme 
the part 
tbsolute 
e chosen 
because 
reatment 
· making 
the case 
1mension 
re indeed 
1mportant 
test, was 
under the 
1able ways 
on known. 
-ting would 
. b h h ,. c the patient From a moral perspective, there IS no dou t t at t e consel " ' Of itself, 
is a requirement for the withdrawal of treatment (or non-tr~atn . rt r) ._ thdrawal 
however, such consent would not have b~en ~ufficient to JU~t! I:. ~; her life . 
or non-treatment. The patien~ ha~ a~ o~hgatJOn to preserve ht., the atient. 
Although this obligation has Its hmits, It m~st be respected h) with!rawing 
And it would be morally wrong for the patient to consent to . legallY 
treatment if such an obligation were present. The fact that It was 
permissible would not chan~e this. . . . self moraiiY 
So even if there is clear evidence of consent, It Will ?ot of It t as well 
justify the withdrawal of treatment. This is ~rue of the Jncon:pete~he proxY 
as the competent patient. In the case of th~ mcompetent pau~~~ented , but 
must assure himself not only that the patient wou ld h~ve c ld cooperate 
also that it was morally permissible to do so , befo re e cou 
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in any decision-making about withdrawing treatment. Without this assurance 
he would have a moral obligation to remove himself from the case. 
The court indeed recognized that the right of self-determination is not 
absolute but is limited, even legally , by a compelling state interest. It 
enumerates four such interests: preserving life, preventing suicide, safe-
guarding the integrity of the medical profession , and protecting innocent 
third parties. At the same time, however, the Court states that ordinarily 
these interests will not foreclose a competent person from declining life-
sustaini ng medical treatment for himself. Presumably, the same would be 
true of an incompetent patient if the conditions of the first test were met. 
This makes one wonder whether compelling state interests will cover the 
whole moral obligation. Certainly the fact that there is clear evidence of 
the patient's refusal of treatment will not of itself justify the cooperation 
of a proxy in withdrawing treatment. As already mentioned. he would also 
have to be sure that it was morally permissible to withdraw treatment before 
he could give his consent. So, whatever the legality of the decision, meeting 
the requirements of the first test would not be enough for a moral judgment 
about withdrawing treatment. 
Limited-Objective Test 
The Conroy decision calls for other testing only when it is not clear that 
the patient would have refused treatment. In this event it requires what it 
classifies as a limited-objective test. This test demands that there be some 
evidence that the patient would have refused treatment. but also requires t~at the decision-maker be satisfied that the burdens of the patient's continued h~e with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him. It elucidates 
th1s norm further. asserting that the patient is suffering. and. will continue 
to suffer throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain, a~d that the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and suffering of 
hJs life with the treatment less the amount and duration of pair• the patient 
would likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly outweigh 
any physical pleasure. emotional enjoyment or intellectual satisfaction that 
the patient may still be able to derive from life . 
Burden And Consent 
From a moral viewpoint we must also raise a few questions about this 
lest. We have already pointed out that even clear consent on the part of 
the Patient would not of itselfJ·ustify withdrawing treatment without further te · · · 
Sling. Here we have to ask whether such testing can supply uncertainty ~bout consent. In other words, will the fact that a treatment is very ~rdensome automatically remove doubt about consent to withdrawing it. 
e do not think so . We say this because even if a particular treatment is ~ery burdensome and. therefore. morally optional. the patient may still warit 1 
-and many patients do. All an analysis of the burdens and benefits of 
November, 1985 
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a treatment shows is that it would be morally permissible c 
patient to have it withdrawn. In itself, it gives u~ n~ as.:.ur~nce o 
The fact that it is burdensome might be more mdtcattve o l 
to have it withdrawn if the alternative was not legitimate . r 
he may legitimately request treatment, clarity of intention will n• 
by showing that refusing treatment w~:>Ul~ be burde~some a 
permissible. And if his intention remams m doubt , the bene t. 
should be in favor of preserving life and treatment. 
Consent and the Incompetent 
it for the 
imention. 
intention 
~ long as 
achieved 
herefore. 
the doubt 
Discerning the wishes of the patient is undoubtedly di ffi• when the 
d · h · h 1 : rson who patient is incompetent. How do~s. one eter~me .t e wts es o 
is incompetent? If the person anttctpated the sttuatton whe~ he mpetent. 
he might have made his wishes sufficiently clear. But tf he . not , what 
can be done? Perhaps the best approach in this event is t~ pt .e the best 
interests of the patient. If it is in the best interests of a patten , terminate 
treatment in these circumstances, there is reason to believe th ~ey~esent 
patient would do likewise . It may be helpful to discern whe t! tt ts m the 
best interests of the patient by examining the decisions com ...:nt people 
make in analogous cases . If competent people generally re1 treatment 
I . . t ' th;r \competent in these cases , one can make a egtttmate presump ton . uall 
patients would also do so . On the other hand, if competent p:. nts us 1~ 
continue treatment, the presumption wou.ld )Je that incompetent I ~tents w~~ve 
also do so . Such presumptions would remforce whatever ev tdc e may 
been present of the patient ' s own intention. Although not as rc .t leas ~~~ar 
evidence of the patient's intentions , it will be suffici~nt to '":a rr ' ~ ~ a dect~~n 
to withdraw treatment in a case where no better evtdence ts ll\ ,ulable. . ~ 
process clearly offers a stronger basis for assuming the consent •Jf the pa:ten 
than a simple judgment that it would be markedly burdensome and . there ore. 
could be legitimatdy withdrawn. 
Quality of Life vs. Quality of Treatment 
. · · · If TraditionallY· The second question has to do wtth the objeCttve test ttse · ke 
moral theologians have admitted that one would not be obliged to ta of 
treatment which would be excessively burdensome or ~ffer no :o~~ent 
benefit. The test speaks of the. burdens~~ the continued. h fe of thas~essing 
with treatment. The difference ts that tradtttOnally theologtans were . tude 
h d · · seems to me the burdens of treatment as such . T e present ectstOn trnent 
the burdens of the patient's life. If these burdens are the effect of the tread nt to 
· · ·d B ·f th y are antece e 
as such , the two approaches will comet e. ~t t e t includes a 
the treatment and therefore , independent of tt, the court te f the 
quality-of-life di~ension. Conceivably, the burde n result!ng. lr~ernedi M· 
k. ·b· t' or arufic ta t' -treatment might be minimal, e.g ., ta . mg an antt to tc, . reatrnent. 
over a short period of time, the maJor burdens antecedmg the t 
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For all practical purposes, what the decision is saying is that the burden 
?fthe person's life itself may be such that there is no obligation to preserve 
It even by means which are only minimally burdensome in themselves or 
the~r e~fects. Traditionally , everyone, even the most handicapped, had no 
obhgat10n to preserve life by treatment which would be effective without 
being too burdensome . The test departs from the traditional moral norm 
in this respect. 
The decision disclaims any intention of allowing withdrawal of treatment 
based on personal worth or the social utility of another's life , or the value 
of that life to others. Insofar as the decision rules out the social utility of 
another's ~ife or the value of that life to others, it is being consistent with 
the norm tt has set down. But it seems contradictory to rule out personal 
~orth.as a criterion and , at the same time, include the patient's quality-of-
hfe Wtth treatment. It is not easy to see the difference between the two. 
If the court saw a difference, it should have pointed it out. 
Burden, Benefit and Proportion 
The traditional moral approach did not call for the kind of comparative 
assessment the present test calls for. The duty to prolong life was determined 
~y the burdens o_r the benefits of a particular treatment , not by a balancing 
f the two. Obv10usly , no normal person would choose pain or any other 
burden unless some good was to be derived from doing so , but there was 
no ~?raJ requirement to measure the burdens against the benefits. In the 
tradtttonal approach, if the pain or other burdens were excessive, whatever 
the benefits of the treatment, it became optional. To demand such a balancing 
would. be to expect too much of most patients. 
baJ Best~es making th~ process itself very difficult , the requirement of 
th ancmg burdens agat.nst benefits could ~ead to. much more rigid conclusions 
an anyone would wtsh. Such conclustons did not surface in the Conroy 
case · or m other court cases, since the concern was whether and to what 
~:te~t the burdens of the patie.nt's life .with t~eatment outweighed the benefits. 
out m the ~e~?ert cas~ (Ca!tf.) the Judge m the Court of Appeals pointed 
be tthe pos~tbthty that tf a treatment offered " significant benefit", it would 
. proportiOnate (and presumably obligatory) even if it were extremely 
:•~ful. In the t.radit~onal approach , whi!e the fact that ~ t~eatment would 
. ery beneficial might have been constdered a factor m mterpreting the 
Wtshes of an incompetent patient, it would not have made it obligatory. If 
::ea~ment caused excessive. pain, it ~ould not be obligatory even if it was 
ecttve. As we shall see , m the thtrd test, the New Jersey Court itself 
=~ed to depart from the balancing requirement in d;aling with treatment 
IC would prolong a life of pain that would be inhumane. 
the A:nal questi~n ~ust be raised about a tendency in the decision to define 
IIIUchurdens of ltfe .m ter~s o.f pain. T.he traditional moral approach was 
111 .broader. Bestdes pam , It would mclude other hardships- cost , or Ytlung else the patient would consider burdensome. It may be that the 
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court was not limiting itself to physical pain but intend.ed. to incli 
pain , anxiety, privation, etc. But if the intention wa~ t~ limit legal · 
to cases of severe physical pain , it was more restnct1 ve than a n 
would require. 
Pure-Objective Test 
lf there is no evidence that the patient would have dec lined 
a third , pure-objecti ve test must be passed. Under thi s test , the 
of the patient 's life with treatment should cle~rl y and marked! 
the benefits that the patient de ri ves from li fe . Further , th\ 
unavoidable and severe pain of the patient 's li fe with treatmer 
such that the effect of administering li fe-sustaining treatme1 
inhumane. 
The fi rst part of the objecti ve requirement of thi s test dol 
perceptibly from the objecti ve requirement of ~he s~cond 
di stingui shes this test is the requirement that the pam ~f li fe "' 
be such that the effec t of further treatment would be mhuma• 
decision is saying is that if the pain of further treatme.nt would l 
it would be legally permiss ible to forego it even without an; 
consent on the part of the patient . 
When Does Pain Become Inhumane? 
: mental 
.hdrawal 
al norm 
catment. 
burdens 
mtweigh 
~curring . 
hould be 
,vould be 
Jot differ 
st. What 
treatment 
What the 
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idence of 
This third test has the advantage over the second test of n· mg it look 
reasonable (i f its conditions could be fulfilled) to conclude t consent 1~ 
withdraw treatment. One can legitimately presume that no rea~· tble pat~en 
. h W 'd th t . . conclusiOn would want treatment that would be m umane. e sa1 a sue 
f h h b d . , great. or could not safely be drawn from the act t at t e ur ens v\ L: h 
that they even outbalanced the benefits. The key question in 11s test then 
. · T f furl er is the following: When does the seventy of pam make the ef L .., 0 . d 
. I d . h ' h t ded I 'ti l contmue treatment inhumane? The test me u es pam w IC an ece . 
5
. e 
th rough) treatment. not simply the pain related to treat~en t <t'. : uch,- e/i~~ ­
we have already dealt with the problem~ related to a q.uah~~ -ot ! 1 t~e cn\olely 
we will not discuss that aspect of the third test. We will asse ~" •11 L: test . 01. 
· f h · seventy in regard to the inhumaneness of treatment stemmmg rom c · . of 
b · h . n , hy reason the pain . When do the effects of treatment ecome m um<t c · 
the severity of the pain? . . . . . wn sake . 
No normal human being des ires or consents to pam fo1 Its 0
1 
. 111e 
· d' 'd • IS SO Ordinarily the reason that makes pain tolerable for the l1l ' " 1. ua . arY 
good to be achieved. He or she is willing to put up with the pa l1l nece~s om 
to achieve that good . The person is not will ing to to lerate pam apart rore 
achiev ing some desired good: he o r she is not will ing t~ tolera te any n~ict 
pain than is necessary to achiev~ thi s good. ~t would be I ~hum,anea~~ '~n an 
such pain on an individual. So It could be mhumanc to Infl ic t P 
individual even apart from its severity. 
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Even if pain is associated with some good , the human being does not 
automatically accept it. He. or she wi ll accept the pain only if he or she 
wishes the good. If the good is something which is obligato ry, e.g. , 
preserving life , and to the extent that it is, he or she must accept the pain 
associated with it. However , the duty to preserve li fe is itself limited by 
the degree of pain associated with the means to do so. If the pain of treatment 
is excessive, the person's obligation of li fe ceases in regard to that treatment. 
But the desire to preserve one's li fe may go beyond his or her duty . The 
person may therefore be willing to accept whatever pain is assoc iated with 
achieving his or her desire. And if the desi re is there, any pain associated 
with achieving it would not be considered inhumane. It would be inhumane 
to inflict pain relating to preservi ng li fe only if it went beyond the person's 
wishes. So , basically, it would be inhumane to inflict pain witho ut some 
benefit. It would also be inhumane to inflict pain beyond the wishes of the 
patient even if some optional good was to be achieved. But the question 
at issue is whether inflicting pain can be considered inhumane by reason 
of its severity , etc. In other words, give n some good to be achieved and 
the wishes of the patient to obtain that good, would it be inhuma ne to do 
so by reason of the severity of the pain involved? 
The assumption underlyi ng the th ird test seems to be that this could happen. 
What is not clear is whether it is say ing that it can he inhumane by reason 
of severity, no matter what the good to be achieved, or whether it i.s say ing 
that it can be inhumane because it is unreasonable in reference to the actual 
good to be achieved (i n thi s case , the quality-of- life to be achieved). 
Theologians would have discussed this in terms of the morality of life-
preserving treatment rather than its humaneness . They did admit that there 
were limits to what one might do to preserve li fe. It would be immoral, 
for instance, to take the li fe of another person to save one's li fe. But to 
my knowledge they never set a li mit to the amount of pain that would be 
m?rally acceptable to preserve li fe. The degree of pain involved in treatment ~Ight release one from any obligation to preserve li fe . but it would not 
Impose an obligation on a patient to forego treatment. It was up to the wishes 
of the patient. So it was on the wishes of the patient that the tradi ti onal 
moral approach put the emphasis, rather than the degree of pain. Theologians 
:ver argued that it would be immoral to accept treatment because of the 
egree of pain involved. And the same would be true of gi1•ing treatment , 
as long as the patient wished it. A legal obligation in this regard would have 
no underlying moral basis . 
Conclusion 
re The .court ultimately overturned the decision of the court of appea ls that 
nrnovmg the tube from Ms . Conroy would be tantamount to tak ing her 
1
1 
e.' ~n the other hand. it did not fee l that the evidence at trial was adeq uate i~ sati sfy the ~ubjecti ve. the limited-objecti ve . or the pure-objective tests 
set up. But smce Ms . Conroy had already died with the tube in situ , there 
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was no need for further exploration of the case. Looking at the 
a moral perspective, we have presented several reasons to shO\' 
of the tests would have sat isfied moral requirements. Even if 
case had passed one or the other of the tests , one wou ld not hm 
to make a moral judgment about withdraw ing the tube on tl 
making this statement we do not wish to imply that legal norms sl 
coincide with moral norms. In the Conroy case, we have see n 
was in some respects less demanding than morality would requt 
it was more demanding. But the relation between law and moral 
larger question which we cannot enter here . Nor do we wi sh 
it was immoral to withdraw the tube. Rather. from a mora l 
we would judge that long-term use of a nasogastric tube n 
burdensome for a patient. and therefore morally optional. If tl 
for (and it seemed to be the case). it would be morally permi' 
Conroy (or her proxy following her wishes) to have the treatnll. 
Our purpose was simply to show that even though passing o r 
of the proposed tests wou ld have made withdrawing the tube 1 
not have guaranteed its rnorality. 
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If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a differ· 
ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The re tu rn postage 
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and 
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with 
your address will be most helpful. 
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A Theologian's Perspective 
Upon Illness and the Human Spirit 
Rev. William Rankin , Ph.D. 
Rector of St. Stephen's Episcopal 
Church, Belvedere, CA. the author 
has held the Rockefeller Foundation 
Fellowship in the Humanities 
(/970) and the Andrew Mellon Post-
Doctoral Fellowship (1977). He 
received his bachelor's , master's 
and doctoral degrees ji-om Duke 
University, and his master ofdivinitr 
degree from the Episcopal Divinit.r 
School, Cambridge, Massachusew,:. 
The following paper is · a 
modification of a talk which he gal'e 
at the Meyer Friedman Institute at 
Mount Zion Hospital in San 
Francisco. 
r A th~ol_ogian is or ought to be concerned with the "spirit'· aspect of human ~e as It IS implie? _in th~ noti?n that human life is a~ least conceivable as ~ th body and spmt. It IS eas1er , of course , to spec1fy what the body is, 
hor one can literally take the measure of that. To speak of the human spiri t, 
~~wever, requ_ires the use of the language of inference and poetry more 
dan _of quantity and measurement. A person's spirit is appropriate ly 
escnbed with the help of such terms as aspiration , duty. gratitude, ~ndence, commitment, hope- qualities which are rather affective more 
. an_q_u~?titative. The poet James Dickey speaks from and to the spiritual 
senslb1ht1es when he describes "the moon lying on the brain as on the exci ted ::so~ the strength of fields . · ' He goes on immediately , ' ' Lord, let me 
pu e w.1!h purpose." (" The strength of fields", 1977) . To "shake with 
rpose refers to human spirit and its ability to mobilize one's life toward 
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